federal district courts across the nation, and serve as a model for most states' procedure systems. 3 Thus, understanding the Federal Rules goes a long way toward understanding U.S. civil procedure in general.
The Federal Rules' basic approach might be described as, "eh, let the trial judge work it out."
4 Through a series of pretrial checkpoints, the Rules seek to sharpen the focus of a case and weed out cases where the plaintiff (the party seeking to change the status quo) can't prevail. Throughout the litigation process, the trial judge has wide discretion over the way the case is litigated. It's easiest to understand this through an example. Suppose that plaintiff Catelyn Stark sues defendant Cersei Lannister for a tort-say, the wrongful death of her husband, Ned. The fi rst stage of proceedings under the Federal Rules focuses on the documents that Stark and Lannister fi le at the beginning of the case. Stark will fi le a complaint, which tells the court the relief she wants and usually identifi es the law that authorizes that relief. 6 Lannister will respond by fi ling either a motion to dismiss (governed by Rule 12) or an answer (governed by Rule 8).
The motion to dismiss permits the defendant to challenge the legal theory (or theories) that the plaintiff 's complaint invokes. For example, if the state where Stark sued didn't recognize a cause of action for wrongful death, Lannister's motion to dismiss would point out that fact and argue that even if the facts alleged in Stark's complaint are true, the case has to be dismissed. 7 Under the Supreme Court's recent controversial decisions in Twombly 8 and Iqbal, 9 a motion to dismiss also permits the court to dismiss a claim if the facts alleged in the complaint don't show a "plausible" entitlement to relief. In essence, these decisions hold that a complaint's factual allegations (as opposed to legal boilerplate, arguments, and inferences drawn from the facts) must show a reasonable probability the defendant violated the law. 10 Thus, if Stark's complaint alleged only that Ned had recently died, and didn't provide any factual details suggesting that Lannister was responsible for his death, the complaint might be dismissed for failure to plead a plausible wrongful death claim.
3.
See, e.g., Stephen N. Once the court deals with any motions to dismiss, Lannister will fi le an answer that responds to the complaint's allegations one by one. The answer can also introduce theories, called affi rmative defenses, that show why Stark can't recover even if the allegations of the complaint are true. 11 For example, Lannister might allege that, although she killed Stark, she was justifi ed in doing so because he posed an imminent danger to public order.
After the answer is fi led, the parties exchange documents, answer written questions posed by attorneys, and sit for depositions-meetings in which an attorney takes the testimony of a witness under oath. This process is called discovery and is governed by Rules 26 through 37. Its goal is to provide both sides with all the evidence relevant to the case and permit them to settle without having to go to trial. 12 When discovery fi nishes, Lannister 13 will move for summary judgment. Under Rule 56, the court may dismiss Stark's wrongful death claim if Stark can't point to evidence that could be used to prove the claim at trial.
14 Summary judgment may also be granted where a reasonable jury couldn't rule in Stark's favor based on the evidence developed in discovery 15 -for example, if a videotape demonstrated beyond question that Lannister wasn't responsible for Ned's death. 16 When the parties have put on their evidence, the court may award judgment as a matter of law if there is only one way the jury could reasonably resolve the case. 17 When judgment is entered, the losing side has the right to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. If the trial court's judgment is not disturbed, it cuts off further litigation between the parties that arises out of the same "transaction or occurrence." 18 Of course, there's more to civil procedure than the Federal Rules. But while subjects such as Erie and jurisdiction consume lots of time in the 1L procedure course, they're not relevant here, because they rarely come up in the historical cases that appear elsewhere in the 1L curriculum.
II. Pre-Modern Civil Procedure
Thus we come to the main subject. What are the strange procedural devices that litter 1L casebooks like dead characters in a George R.R. Martin novel?
A. Law vs. Equity
The fi rst thing to know is that there were not one but two procedural systems used prior to the creation of modern procedural systems: "common law" procedure and "equity" procedure. The reason has to do with the historical development of the English courts.
In the Middle Ages, the king exercised all the judicial and executive powers of government-and some legislative powers as well. 19 There was no formal process for asking the king to resolve a dispute, so citizens who needed the state's assistance appeared at royal court and petitioned for relief.
Around the 13th century, the fi rst courts of law evolved out of the king's council. Instead of resolving disputes on a case-by-case basis, the king's clerks would issue a writ (or order) in the name of the king that directed a court to resolve a dispute in a particular way. For example, the "writ of right" directed the court to determine the owner of real estate by supervising a "trial by battle" between the competing claimants.
20 W rits were customized to petitioners' specifi c problems at fi rst, but became standardized over time. As described below, the writs came to defi ne a case's "form of action," which defi ned the kind of procedure the court would use, the kind of evidence the plaintiff had to present to recover, and the remedies the courts would award.
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Despite the creation of the law courts, citizens continued to petition the king for assistance in cases that weren't covered by an established writ. Meanwhile Parliament, jealous of its own authority, restricted the king's authority to issue new writs. 22 The king authorized his chancellor to resolve the leftover petitions that weren't covered by an established writ. This eventually led to the creation of an alternate court system, the courts of equity, for cases where the courts of law couldn't provide an adequate remedy. In the courts of equity, cases were tried by the chancellor or master of rolls, not a judge and jury. The Lady of the Lake, her arm clad in the purest shimmering samite held aloft Excalibur from the bosom of the water, signifying by divine providence that I, Arthur, was to carry Excalibur. That is why I am your king.").
20. The procedure is not quite as impressive as its name suggests. A party could "generally delay the action for a year and a day by betaking himself to his bed." FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: A COURSE OF LECTURES 21 (1936). Nevertheless, "care was taken to see that his excuse was not too unreal. Four knights were sent to visit him, to ascertain whether he had malum transiens or a languor-which was what he needed-after consideration of whether they found him vagantem per rura or 'in bed as befi ts a man making such excuse, unbooted, unbreeched and ungirt, or even naked which is more.'" Id. When reading an old opinion, it's easy to tell whether the case was decided by a court of law or court of equity. The fi rst clue is the decision-maker. As noted, cases at law were decided by a judge and jury whereas equity cases were decided by the chancellor or master of rolls. The second clue is the name of the court. The two main common law courts were the King's Bench and the Court of Common Pleas. The two main courts of equity were the Court of Exchequer and Chancery, a name that continues to be used in Delaware. 23 The last clue to the kind of court is the remedy the court awarded. The prototypical remedy in an action at common law is money damages. Equity courts generally awarded injunctive relief-i.e., they ordered a party to do something or stop doing something.
See infra
All of these courts heard cases in London. But judges periodically would hear cases throughout England and Wales, in sittings known as assizes. 24 If a diffi cult question of law arose, it might be referred to the collected judges of a court who would hear it en banc, i.e., sitting together as a full court. 25 Especially diffi cult questions were sometimes heard by the twelve judges of the King's Bench, Court of Exchequer, and Court of Common Pleas sitting in a kind of super en banc proceeding.
26

B. Common Law Procedure
With the diff erence between law and equity in mind, we can turn to the procedural terminology used in old cases. Common law procedure is defi ned by three features, each of which generated its own terminology. 27 1. The writ system. The fi rst feature of common law procedure is the writ system. As noted above, a common law case began when the plaintiff obtained a writ from the king's clerks that directed the defendant to appear and authorized a court to hear the case. The writ the plaintiff obtained determined the case's form of action-essentially, a bundle of custom and precedent that defi ned the applicable substantive law, the procedure the court would follow, the kind of evidence the plaintiff had to produce to prevail, and the remedies the court could award if it found that the defendant violated the plaintiff 's rights. 23 . At some points in its history, the Court of Exchequer also exercised jurisdiction over common law cases. To appreciate the diff erence between a writ and a form of action, think of a baseball game. When the umpire proclaims, "Play ball!" at the beginning of the game, he directs the players to play a game of baseball. The rules that govern that game-its "form of action," if you like-are not defi ned by the umpire's direction to "Play ball!" but by the Major League Baseball rulebook, custom, and precedent. So too with writs and forms of action. Whereas a writ was the formal order that directed the case to go forward, the form of action was the body of law, precedent, and custom that defi ned how the litigants were to play the "game" picked out by the writ. 28 Much of the confusing terminology in historical cases has to do with the form of action at issue, which, as noted, followed from the writ that the plaintiff obtained. Because Parliament had limited the king's authority to issue new writs, a crucial question for the parties and the judge was whether an existing writ could be stretched to accommodate a novel fact pattern. For example, there was no cause of action for wrongful death at common law. Thus, in Stark's lawsuit against Lannister, a judicial decision might focus on whether an action for wrongful death could be maintained through an action for "trespass"-the common law cause of action for injuries directly caused by the wrongful act of another. 29 Common law courts devoted enormous energy to such questions, often reasoning in a style reminiscent of Monty Python's Flying Circus. 30 28. Maitland described the distinction as follows:
Let it be granted that one man has been wronged by another; the fi rst thing that he or his advisers have to consider is what form of action he shall bring. It is not enough that in some way or another he should compel his adversary to appear in court [through the appropriate writ] . . . [A] "form of action" has implied a particular original process, a particular mesne process, a particular fi nal process, a particular mode of pleading, of trial, of judgment. But further to a very considerable degree the substantive law administered in a given form of action has grown up independently of the law administered in other forms. Each procedural pigeon-hole contains its own rules of substantive law, and it is with great caution that we may argue from what is found in one to what will probably be found in another; each has its own precedents. MAITLAND , supra note 20, at 1. Appendix I lists eleven forms of action at common law. Because the form of action identifi ed the theory of the case, the evidentiary showing that the plaintiff had to make to recover, and the remedy the court could award, identifying the form of action at issue in an old case will generally make the case easier to understand. For example, if the court identifi es the case as one of "general assumpsit," we know that plaintiff is seeking to recover damages for the breach of a promise. The court's analysis will probably focus on whether there is an enforceable contractual obligation, whether the defendant performed satisfactorily, or another issue that comes up in contract disputes.
2. The pleading system. The second feature of common law procedure was its elaborate pleading system. The common law pleading system sought to limit the number of issues in a case. 31 Ideally, the exchange of pleadings would narrow the case to a single question that could either be decided by the court or put to a jury.
The basic moves in common law pleading are familiar from modern civil procedure, but the terminology is diff erent. For example, in Stark's suit against Lannister, Stark would begin by fi ling a declaration-the equivalent of a complaint-that expanded on the original writ she obtained from the royal court with details such as the time and place of injury. Lannister would respond by making a plea that challenged either the legal basis for the suit or the facts alleged in Stark's declaration.
A plea known as the demurrer (the second syllable rhymes with "fur," not "cure") performed a function similar to the modern motion to dismiss. It allowed the defendant to argue that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief even if the allegations in the declaration were true. 32 Thus, assuming a jurisdiction followed the old common law rule denying recovery for wrongful death, Lannister could obtain dismissal of Stark's wrongful death suit through a demurrer which pointed out that, even if she killed Ned Stark, that fact did not support liability in tort.
Another plea, the confession and avoidance, functioned similarly to a modern affi rmative defense. 33 Through this plea, Lannister could raise the argument that, even if she killed Ned, she was justifi ed in doing so. The traverse functioned like a modern answer and provided an opportunity for the defendant to contest the declaration's factual allegations. 34 Thus, Lannister's traverse might contend that Ned died of natural causes, or that if someone cut off his head, it wasn't a Lannister. replication), to which Lannister would respond with another (the rejoinder), and so on. Through technical pleading rules, most of the potential issues in the case would be eliminated at the pleading stage, rather than being contested in later proceedings. The objective was to narrow the case to a single issue of law or fact that could be decided by a judge (if the issue was one of law) or jury (if the issue was one of fact). 35 Many issues that would today be resolved later in litigation-who did what when, the appropriate theory of liability, the extent of damages, etc.-would, at common law, be decided on the basis of the pleadings.
3. Trial and appeal. After the pleadings closed, any legal questions that remained would be decided by the court. Factual issues on which "issue was joined" would be decided by a jury. (Discovery was unavailable, and summary judgment was not introduced until 1855.
)
The fi rst-level trial court often was called the nisi prius court. After the parties put on their evidence, the defendant could move for a nonsuit or directed verdict.
37
Attorneys thought of the nonsuit as a demurrer directed at the trial evidence. Just as Lannister's demurrer would have argued that Stark was not entitled to relief based on the facts alleged in the declaration because the jurisdiction did not recognize liability for wrongful death, her motion for nonsuit would have argued that Stark couldn't recover based on the evidence introduced at trial. When there was only one reasonable outcome, the directed verdict device allowed the judge to dictate the jury's verdict. For example, if all the witnesses testifi ed that it was a Tully and not a Lannister who killed Ned, the judge would direct a verdict for Lannister.
If the jury returned a verdict in favor of Lannister, Stark could move for a judgment non obstante veredict (JNOV)-literally, "judgment notwithstanding the verdict."
38 Even though the parties had presented evidence, this motion was based on the pleadings. It permitted Stark to ask for judgment based on a feature of the pleadings that emerged during trial, notwithstanding the jury's verdict for Lannister. The corresponding defense-side motion was the motion for arrest of judgment. 39 All of these devices-the nonsuit, directed verdict, JNOV, and motion for arrest of judgment-have been consolidated in the modern motion for judgment as a matter of law.
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After the nisi prius court entered judgment, the losing party could appeal. Parliament took an active role defi ning appellate courts' jurisdiction throughout the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, so the forum in which an appeal was heard varied over time. 41 In general, appeal began by bringing an issue before the court en banc-i.e., before all of the judges of the court-and may have continued in an intermediate appellate court. A party who lost in an intermediate appellate court could pursue a further appeal to the House of Lords (the upper house of Parliament) in cases of exceptional importance.
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The appellate process began when the losing side obtained a writ addressed to the lower court. The appellate court would typically issue a rule nisi, an order that directed the party who won in the trial court to explain why the judgment should not be reversed or set aside. 43 When the appellate court gave its decision, the rule nisi would be discharged if the party who won in the trial court (the appellee) successfully defended the judgment, or a rule absolute would issue, which converted the rule nisi into the appellate court's permanent ruling. A rule absolute refl ected the appellate court's decision that the trial court had erred in some respect, and that the outcome should be reversed or the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
C. Equity Procedure
Because the 1938 Federal Rules of Procedure were modeled on the equity procedure system, procedure in old equity cases is easier to follow than procedure in cases at common law. 44 An equity case was initiated through a bill (like a complaint) that described the petitioner's (i.e., plaintiff 's) predicament at length. 45 The respondent (defendant) would fi le a demurrer (like a motion to dismiss), a challenge to the legal suffi ciency of the bill, or an answer, a response to the bill's factual allegations.
46
A central diff erence between common law and equity procedure was the evidence upon which cases were decided. Evidence in equity generally took the form of documents such as affi davits. Even when evidence started out as oral testimony, it would be reduced to writing.
Perhaps more important, the parties could collect evidence through a process that resembled modern discovery. 47 The chancellor or master of rolls would make rulings as evidence became available, and order additional discovery if he thought more information was necessary to resolve an issue. The ensuing proceedings sometimes lasted for decades, as famously described in Charles Dickens' Bleak House.
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Eventually, the chancellor would enter a decree that set out his decision. Juries were not used in equity, a distinction preserved in the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which limits the right to a jury trial to suits at common law. 49 Until the 19th century, Chancery had only two judges, the chancellor and the master of rolls. 50 A losing litigant could appeal from the latter to the former. In cases decided by the chancellor, a litigant could only ask him to reconsider his decision or seek review in the House of Lords.
III. A Case Study
Having introduced the basic features of pre-modern procedure, I close with a case study that illustrates the value of understanding it. I take as my example Byrne v. Boadle, which introduced the idea of res ipsa loquitur to Anglo-American law.
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As every 1L student learns, negligence means taking a risk that is unreasonable under the circumstances. The question in Byrne was whether a jury could infer negligence simply from the way the plaintiff had been injured.
The plaintiff Byrne was walking down the street when he was struck in the head by a fl our barrel that fell from a second-fl oor window of the defendant's shop. Because he had been clobbered by a fl our barrel, Byrne understandably could not testify about what was happening in the shop prior to the accident. Other witnesses confi rmed that a fl our barrel had fallen from the shop window. But, like Byrne, they couldn't provide details about what was happening in the defendant's shop before the barrel fell. As such, the jury didn't hear any direct evidence that the defendant's employees had been working carelessly. For all the plaintiff and his witnesses knew, the defendant's employees were working as carefully as brain surgeons.
After both sides' witnesses testifi ed, the defendant argued "there was no evidence of negligence for the jury" and the trial judge agreed. The 48. "This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, become so complicated, that no man alive knows what it means. The parties to it understand it least; but it has been observed that no two Chancery lawyers can talk about it for fi ve minutes, without coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises. Innumerable children have been born into the cause; innumerable young people have married into it; innumerable old people have died out of it. Scores of persons have deliriously found themselves made parties in Jarndyce and Jarndyce, without knowing how or why; whole families have inherited legendary hatreds with the suit." CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 3 (1853).
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." (emphasis added)). judge "nonsuited the plaintiff , reserving leave to him to move the Court of Exchequer to enter the verdict for him with 50l. damages, the amount assessed by the jury." 52 In other words, the judge dismissed the plaintiff 's claim but gave him leave (permission) to ask the Court of Exchequer to award him £50. The ensuing appeal turned on a procedural question: Had Byrne presented enough evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendant's employees had been negligent?
Byrne obtained a rule nisi directing Boadle to show cause why the judgment should not be reversed. The Court of Exchequer concluded that under the circumstances, the injury "spoke for itself:" res ipsa loquitur. The Court of Exchequer therefore converted the rule nisi into a rule absolute and reversed the trial court's decision denying any relief to Mr. Byrne. Pursuant to the Court of Exchequer's order, the unfortunate Mr. Byrne recovered his fi fty pounds.
The keys to Byrne are the trial judge's nonsuit and the Court of Exchequer's reversal of that ruling. The nonsuit expressed the trial judge's view that the evidence Byrne off ered was insuffi cient to show the defendant's employees acted negligently. Reversing that ruling, the Court of Exchequer held that the evidence was suffi cient to conclude that the defendant acted negligently.
Byrne established the legal principle that some injuries show the defendant was negligent based on nothing more than the fact of the injury. When a fl our barrel falls from a shop's second-fl oor window and clobbers a passer-by, a jury may conclude that the shop's employees acted negligently even if no one testifi es about what the employees were doing prior to the accident. Or to take the modern analogue: When someone who recently had an operation fi nds a scalpel in her gut, a jury may reasonably conclude that the surgeon was negligent, even if what happened during the surgery is unknown.
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As this example shows, understanding pre-modern procedure makes it easier to understand the development of Anglo-American law. With a little procedural know-how, decisions like Byrne make a lot more sense. 
Some Popular Writs
"Original" writs were used to initiate a case, direct the sheriff to compel the defendant to appear, and authorize the court to hear the case. For each of the eleven common law forms of action listed in the table above, there was a writ with the same name. When describing a case's procedural history, courts might identify either the writ or form of action. For example, Pickle v. Page stated that a "writ of trespass"-shorthand for trespass on the case-permitted a plaintiff to recover damages "for a parrot, a popinjay, [or] a thrush" that the defendant abducted. 54 Pierson v. Post, a case seeking damages for the defendant's taking of a fox that the plaintiff had almost captured, described the case as "an action of trespass on the case."
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In addition to the original writs, litigants could petition for "extraordinary" or "prerogative" writs. These were used by courts to control the actions of other parts of government, government offi cers, and sometimes private individuals. A few of the most common extraordinary writs are listed below. For a complete listing, see the current edition of BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY. 
